When we say something is natural, for example, natural apple juice, we perceive it as something good, something beneficial. Thus, natural law, being an original moral theory which explains the way the law operates as part of the broader moral life of human beings, should be something good, something beneficial too. It should not be seen as a “labyrinth of confusion” based on moral prejudices or unprovable speculation about human nature (Bentham); nor should it be seen as “like a harlot, natural law is at the disposal of everyone”. (Alf Ross)

In order to come up with a natural law theory that is good and beneficial, it is of utmost importance to first decide on the definition of “natural”. The word “natural” here refers to human’s nature. I will attempt to define it in a general, simple way. My definition will be something like the house in Aquinas’ analogy of the architect: my definition will only provide the framework or structure of the natural law “house”. It does not specify how wide the scope of natural law “door” be, and things like that.

For me, I disagree with what Thomas Hobbes said in Leviathan, Chapter XIII: that human’s life in their natural condition is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” I see human’s nature from the perspective of what we need as an infant to keep us alive, and what are the common characteristics we have when we grew up, with these basic necessities consistently provided to us during the period when we grow up.

 Basically, we need air, food, water, shelter and clothes to survive. Assuming that we live in utopia where everyone grow up with these necessities provided to us. We will not be having a human capacity and readiness to hurt others, as opposed to what Hart termed as human vulnerability under his minimum content of morality. We will be bored of merely surviving. We will seek to improve our lives in every aspect that we can. I agree with Hart, who follows Protagoras and Hobbes by putting survival of human society as the necessary and basic aim. When human have the ability and means to survive, they start looking for something better, which is morality of aspiration, a term introduced by Fuller, which means morality of the “good life, of excellence, of the fullest realization of human powers”.

This “good life” should consist of Finnis’ seven basic values: knowledge, play, life, aesthetic  experience, sociability, practical reasonableness and religion (the value of seeking to understand man’s place in the universe).

Therefore, to survive and flourish are human’s goal, or in Aristotle’s term, telos. Anything human do, they are doing it to survive and flourish – not for short term, but for long term. It is human’s nature that we all desire to live long and prosper. This is the reason why a wise person will avoid doing something that will harm others: karma exists – what comes around goes around.

I agree with Cicero and Aquinas  (to a certain extent) that natural law is discoverable by reason. Some may argue that everyone has different way of reasoning. In my opinion, there is only one correct way of reasoning, and it is so simple that anyone who is willing to sit and think about it for some time would have surely thought of it. The correct, moral way of reasoning is: to think of a solution to whatever problem you are facing that will enable you to survive and live a good life without harming others. If we all reason like this, we will come to a conclusion that homosexual acts should not be labeled as “unnatural offence” in Malaysia since it is an activity that does not harm others; a woman should have right to abortion but this is subjected to which stage of pregnancy she is at and we need science to tell us when exactly does life begin; and Hitler’s reasoning that the Jews should be killed because they cause the German people to suffer financially is clearly wrong, because he is harming others.

I disagree with the view that natural law is derived by God, as claimed by Cicero and Aquinas. First of all, no one can be sure of the existence of God. Secondly, if natural law is derived by God, which God are we referring to? Is it Jesus? Is it Tuhan? Is it Buddha? Maybe at the end of the day, all these Gods are actually the same God, but right now, people all over the world are believing in all kind of different God, and we see some religious ones who would fight with others to defend their version of God. Wars are declared between Christians and Muslims in the name of religion. People who refuse to convert to Christian were killed during Christian Missionaries in South America. Human history has shown that the concept of God is subjective. Natural law theory and the meaning of natural cannot be subjective. It has to be objective. It needs to be something that is capable of being agreed upon.

I prefer Hugo Grotius’ view. He asserts that God himself is part of nature, and that even if God did not exist, natural law would have the same content. I agree that God should be taken out of the picture of natural law. After all, law is made by human for human. It is not made for God. We are governing ourselves in a way that best suits our nature – human’s nature, not God’s nature, or God’s perception of our nature.

Allow me to share a story to illustrate my point; a person passed by a temple saw Guanyin, God of Mercy, praying in the temple. He noticed that Guanyin was praying to a statue of Guanyin. Out of curiosity, this man asked Guanyin: “Why are you praying to yourself?” To which Guanyin replied: “Whatever problem I am facing, the only person who can help me is me myself. Therefore, I pray to myself.”

Isn’t that true in our context too? The belief that natural law comes from God stems from the fear to take up responsibilities for our actions. It is easier to say “I am doing this because of God” that to come up with a proper, logical, rational, morally correct explanation.  To quote Kelsen, the view that natural law comes from God satisfied a deeply-rooted need of the human mind, the need for justification. To justify the subjective value judgments, which emerge from the emotional element of his consciousness, man tries to present them as objective principles. Alf Ross had said something to similar effect: “By seeking justification for our actions in immutable principles outside ourselves, we try to relieve ourselves of the burden of responsibility.”

I think that with a slight modification on Gustav Radbruch’s two-stage test, it would be a reasonably beneficial version of natural law. Gustav Radbruch proposed that rules must satisfy the formal criteria of making law and the rules must be moral in that it must recognise individual freedom. I will start by modifying the moral filter first.

Moral should not be seen as recognizing individual freedom. My version of moral is: doing something that allows you to survive and live a good life without harming others. However, reality is not utopia. I agree with John Locke’s view that the state of nature of property was inadequately protected. This is self-evident: some countries have more resources than others due to geography. It is important for us to tolerate, compromise and respect each other. The state of limited resources means Radbruch’s view of what is moral does not have the capacity to achieve consensus in society. It goes against Dworkin’s conception of a morality that is objective. I think my version of moral, thought it could be criticized as being too general and too simple, is actually more capable of achieving consensus in society. (I think the only people who will disagree with my view on morality are the cannibals.)

I now move on to Radbruch’s requirements of formalities. For me, this formalities not only refer to the procedures of making law, but it should satisfy Fuller’s eight desideratas as well: law must be general, must be published, must not be retrospective, must be clear and intelligible, must be consistent, must be capable of achievement, must not be contradictory, must demonstrate a degree of congruence between the officials.

I believe that the word “natural” in natural law refers to both human’s nature and law’s natural characteristics. I think instead of saying Professor Hart and Fuller are shadow-boxing on different planes, we can say that most jurists who discussed natural law are shadow-boxing on different planes. By taking out the correct elements from all jurists, I’ve come to my natural law theory that, in my opinion, is the correct natural law. I see it as a simple theory capable of being understood by the majority of the public, a general theory capable of progressing with the progress of society, and, to use Cicero’s words: “right reason in agreement with Nature, of universal application, unchanging and everlasting”.