For every paper, I have to answer four questions, and for each question, the maximum score is 25. Same for my assignments. So far, the highest score I obtained for my assignments was 15, so you can imagine how surprised I was when I received 19 for my evidence assignment (2008 Zone B Part 1 Question 1). I know it’s going to be extremely boring for those who come across my blog to read a 3-page-plus assignment, but please bear with me, okay? The joy was so overwhelming that I had to share it here.
NOTE: My boyfriend thought it looked like a 14 instead of 19, but I was quite sure I saw my lecturer scribbled a 19 on my paper.
NOTE 2: Some paragraphs do not seem to be connected with the essay as a whole because my lecturer had striked off three whole paragraphs he considered as “unnecessary examples.”
Question:
What justifications have been put forward for having a rule against hearsay? How convincing are they?
Hearsay is defined in section 1(2) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 as a statement made otherwise than by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings which is tendered as evidence of the matters stated. As a general rule, hearsay evidence is not admissible. This is stated in Cross on Evidence – “an assertion other than one made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of any fact asserted” – and this rule is adopted by Lord Havers LC in R v Sharp.
Oath is seen as a ceremonial and religious symbol which may induce in the witness a feeling of special obligation to speak the truth. Taking of the oath is also a powerful disincentive to perjury. Psychological and anecdotal evidence suggests that the taking of oath may at least have the effect of making witnesses more cautious when giving their testimony than they might otherwise be, and since hearsay evidence is made out of court rather than an oath in the court. However, even Tregarthen had argued in 1915 that the objection to admission of hearsay on the basis that one is not in fear of punishment for stating what is not true is, in the twentieth century, a consideration that has no weight, as people are no longer over-awed by the mummery of oath. Oath is not an absolute guarantor of reliability – even the substantive law of hearsay appears to treat the oath as being of secondary importance to cross-examination as a means of ensuring the reliability of evidence. Grose J had said in R v Eriswell (The Inhabitants): “Evidence, though upon oath, to affect an absent person, is incompetent, because he cannot cross-examine; as nothing can be more unjust than that a person should be bound by evidence which he is not permitted to hear.” Therefore, oath does not seem to be a convincing justification for rule against hearsay. What about cross-examination?
Wigmore had described cross-examination as “beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth”, as it constitutes a powerful weapon in exposing the possible unreliability of the witness’s testimony. Cross-examination is said to be able to expose faulty perception, erroneous memory, ambiguity in narration and insincerity. However, is cross examination that powerful? There may be situations where a witness’s testimony will be successfully “broken down” in cross-examination where the witness will end up admitting to lying, but a strong-willed witness intent on deceiving will be unlikely to be affected by the process of cross-examination. He would have planned his story ahead. He might even have rehearsed it. Therefore, cross-examination is likely to be much less effective in exposing insincerity. Furthermore, efficacy of cross-examination in exposing faulty perception may be limited too. Also, suggesting facts to a witness in cross examination may actually distort, rather than assist his or her memory. If a witness is being questioned on the scene of the murder :”How was the scene? Was the alley empty, or was there anything that might suggest that there might be someone lurking in the corner?” The witness probably had not observed anything strange at all, but the way the question was phrased could trigger him to think “I indeed saw some large boxes in the corner” and he would continue to think “the area where the boxes were located were darker… I think there were shadows around the boxes… It must be human’s shadow… What does a shadow indicate?” which eventually led him to think “yes! There was someone hiding behind the boxes!” After all, memories are fragile. Also, it should be noted that cross-examination would be of little utility in a case like Myers v DPP, where the hearsay evidence in question was a contemporaneous record made by workers in a motor car factory of cylinder block and chassis numbers. How could cross-examination help in such a situation? Surely the workers’ recollection of several years later of parts and numbers have been non-existent.
Apart from oath and cross-examination )both which our analysis above had proven them to be not that convincing as justification for rule against hearsay), demeanour is also another justification for rule against hearsay. Observation of the demeanour of a witness would provide a good indication of the reliability of his testimony. Sergel had argued that the stress experienced by a perjurer, coming from the fear and public humiliation and prosecution would contribute to their demeanour, which can be used to detect their unreliability. On the other hand, Wellborn had presented experimental research which revealed that demeanour is of little benefit to ordinary observers in assessing whether a person is untruthful. Observation of facial behavior may actually decreases the accuracy of lie detection, and little assistance would be gained from listening to the voice of the respondent, as there is no compelling evidence that lying is accompanied by distinctive body behavior which can be discerned by observers. The capacity of ordinary people to detect unreliability by observing demeanour could be said as nothing more than a myth, hence it is definitely not a convincing justification for having a rule against hearsay.
Perhaps the most convincing justification for having a rule against hearsay is the fact that hearsay evidence is not the best evidence. Allow me to quote A.Pope, The Temple of Fame:
“The flying Rumours gather’d as they roll’d;
Scarce any Tale was sooner heard than told;
And all who told it, added something new;
And all who heard it, made Enlargements too.”
The descriptions of events can become distorted as they are passed from person to person, either due to defects in the perception, memory, sincerity, or ability to narrate clearly of the maker of the statement. As Loftus described it, ability to perceive an event accurately is dependent on “event factor” and “witness factor”, which include length of time for which the witness was exposed to the event, frequency of exposure to the event and significance of the event, and a variety of other factors. Generally, the longer the time a witness is exposed to an event, or the more frequent he is exposed to it, or the more the significant the event is, the ability to perceive an event accurately will be higher. Faulty perception could also be caused by factors like cultural expectations, expectations from past experience, personal prejudices, momentary or temporary expectations, perceptual activity and stress. A classic experiment conducted by Allport and Postman clearly shows that people who are prejudiced against Blacks are more likely to perceive Blacks as criminals, even though this might not be the case.
Also, in detecting ambiguity, the “filling phenomenon” may make the task more difficult than it already is. On hearing an account of events, there is a tendency to compensate for any ambiguities by “filing in” gaps with considerations drawn from our past experience or knowledge. In Huff v White Motor Corp, there was a statement made by a deceased person that “as he was approaching the curve or starting into it his pant leg was on fire and he was trying to put his pant leg out and lost control and hit the bridge abutment and then the truck was on fire.” It is unclear, but most people who heard the statement would have formed a clear picture of the events in their minds through the filling phenomenon, and this formed picture might or might not be what actually had happened. Another example is found in the celebrated 1952 trial for murder of Derek Bentley, where Bentley had shouted to the principal offender, “Let him have it, Chris.” What as Bentley trying to say: to start the shooting, or to let the police have the gun? It remains unclear.
Another sound justification for rule against hearsay is extrinsic policy considerations. In Nesson’s view, hearsay rule is a mechanism for promoting continuing public acceptance of jury verdicts. Individuals would also surely regard as procedurally fairer a system where observers of events testify directly to what they saw, than one where hearsay evidence is adduced, which will in turn encourage compliance with the law. Hearsay rule also acts as a deterrent to certain types of police impropriety, discouraging police from extracting statements from witnesses by questionable means, as hearsay rule will prohibit admissibility of out-of-court statements. More importantly, the rule against hearsay protects the value of individual dignity in criminal proceedings. The ability of an accused person to confront and cross-examine the maker of a statement against him, and not just a person reporting the statement, is consistent with the right of accused person to be treated with dignity.
Some of the justifications for hearsay rule may seem irrelevant today, but most of it remain as sound and convincing justification for having a rule. Of course, there remains situations where hearsay evidence should be admitted in the interest of justice as there are circumstances where hearsay evidence will be the best evidence, but that will not be a discussion for the purpose of this essay. For now, it is enough to remember that although C.F.H. Tapper said that although the statements of third persons are acted upon in the practical affairs of everyday life without the slightest hesitation or suspicion and that ordinary experience shows that it is quite safe to infer the existence of a thing or the happening of an event from second-hand testimony, the fact remains that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done, and that is why there is a need to have rule against hearsay.